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two

different

summary

judg-

amendment,,

c? 1987 amendment (§ 63-30-2(4)) and the 1991 amendment (§ 63-303 ( 2 ) ( a ) ) both i n c l u d e d t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e University Hospital within the
d e f i n i t i o n of "governmental f u n c t i o n . " Because S h e l l y H i p w e l l ' s i n j u r y occurred
in 1988, t h i s case i s c o n t r o l l e d by the 1987 amendment. Defendant has not r a i s e d
the i s s u e of the 1991 amendment on t h i s appeal t o avoid r e t r o a c t i v i t y arguments.
1

summary judgment plaintiff had to prove that both of these amendments

were

unconstitutional.

However,

plaintiff's

memorandum focused exclusively on the 1991 amendment.

opposing

Plaintiff's

only reference to the 1987 amendment was contained in a singlesentence footnote that concluded without support that the 1987
amendment is "clearly invalid."

(R. 646). Plaintiff has recently

attempted to dismiss her complete failure to discuss the 1987
amendment by alleging that the principal argument raised by Sharp
was the 1991 amendment and that the 1987 amendment was raised by
Sharp only "in passing."

(Appellee's Brief, p. 5).

This is

absolutely untrue, as reflected by the record.
In his supporting brief defendant Sharp fully set forth the
text of both the 1987 and 1991 amendments. Significantly, the text
of the 1987 amendment was set forth first.
the entire

remaining

portion

(R. 552). Throughout

of his memorandum

Sharp always

referred to the 1987 and 1991 amendments in tandem.

Additionally,

in every reference to the two amendments, the 1987 amendment was
always identified

first.

(See R. 555, 561, 565, 567, 577).

Plaintiff has no basis for alleging that the 1987 amendment was
raised "in passing."

Plaintiff failed to address the 1987 amend-

ment and therefore failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the amendment is unconstitutional. The trial court obviously erred

At the trial level plaintiff used the greater portion of her opposing memorandum
to argue that the 1991 amendment cannot be applied retroactively. Defendant
responded by citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), which applied the
1978 amendment retroactively to conclude that the University Hospital performed
"governmental functions." Plaintiff admitted the facts necessary to invoke the
1991 amendment. (R.166, 334-35).
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a number of cases. Not one of the cited cases supports plaintiff's
position.

The case relied upon most heavily by plaintiff is

Hershel v. University Hosp. Found., 610 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1980).
Hershel held that the State of Oklahoma was capable of performing
"proprietary functions" under Oklahoma's governmental immunity act.
Hershel did not hold that a state entity performed "proprietary
functions" at common law.

Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has

subsequently acknowledged that Hershel represents a departure from
the common law and has refused to apply Hershel retroactively. See
Burns v. Rader. 723 P.2d 266, 267-68 (Okla. 1986); Fox v. Oklahoma
Memorial Hosp., 774 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla. 1989).
Plaintiff

also cites Hartford

Wainscott. 19 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1933).

Accident

& Indem. Co. v.

However, Hartford did not

hold that states were capable of performing "proprietary functions"
at common law.

Hartford did not even involve a suit against a

government entity.

Rather, Hartford acknowledged the differing

treatment given to states and municipalities at common law. Id. at
330.
The remaining cases cited by plaintiff not only fail to
support her position, but also provide direct support to defendant.
See Henry v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 478 P.2d 898, 901 (Okla.
1970) ("This state has long been committed to the rule, without a
single exception, that the State is immune from suits without its
waiver or consent", citing 18 cases); Union Trust Co. v. State, 99
P. 183, 188 (Cal. 1908) (even though a state might be liable for
breach of contract, the state cannot be sued without its consent);
McCoy v. Kenosha County, 218 N.W. 348
4
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'
T

•

In

my

* <arly Utah cases
-

mm in i i i p.i II i

the state was immune.

One example is the differing treatment given to states and
municipalities for water supply activities.

Whenever a munici-

pality was sued at common law for injuries or property damage
arising from the negligent construction or maintenance of canals
and water courses, the Utah courts consistently held that such
activities were

"proprietary

immunity did not extend.

functions" to which governmental

See e.g. Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah

63, 1 P. 160 (1881); L e w v. Salt Lake City, 5 Utah 302, 16 P. 598
(1888); Kiesel & Co. v. Ogden City, 8 Utah 237, 30 P. 758 (1892);
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 (1908); Davis v.
Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 74 (1920); Eaelhoff v. Oaden City,
71 Utah 511, 267 P. 1011 (1928).

However, when the state was sued

for the same activity the suit was dismissed, as shown in Wilkinson
v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913).
The plaintiff in Wilkinson attempted to sue the state for
defects in an irrigation reservoir and canal that broke and damaged
the plaintiff's property.

However, unlike the municipal cases the

plaintiff's complaint in Wilkinson was summarily dismissed.

The

Utah Supreme Court explained that sovereign immunity prevented the
very act of filing a complaint against the state without consent:
In the absence of either express constitutional or
statutory authority an action against a sovereign state
cannot be maintained. The doctrine is elementary and of
universal application, and so far as we are aware there
is not a single authority to the contrary.
Id. at 630, 42 Utah at 492-93.
The Court explained that sovereign immunity "shielded the
state from being sued in the courts" and that without consent the

6

courts lacked jurisdiction to even entertain a suit against the
state.

Id. at 631, 42 Utah at 495.

The great weight of precedent demonstrates that common-law
courts extended immunity to state entities without considering the
entity7s activities.

This contrasted with the application of

sovereign immunity to municipalities, where the courts looked past
the entity and considered the activity.
B.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED OR PROVEN THAT THE UGIA
DEPRIVES HER OF A REMEDY AGAINST STATE EMPLOYEES.
Plaintiff argues that the UGIA is unconstitutional because it

deprives her of a common law remedy against state employees without
providing an adequate substitute remedy.

With respect to this

argument it is important to understand the lower court proceedings.
Defendant's initial memorandum in support of summary judgment
argued that plaintiff's settlement was reasonable as a matter of
law because plaintiff was injured by an employee of the College of
Medicine and that, even after Condemarin, the liability of the
College of Medicine was limited to $250,000 under the UGIA.
Plaintiff's

opposing

memorandum

did

not

contest

defendant's

arguments, but rather argued that the University Hospital was also
liable and that the liability limit was unconstitutional with
regards to the University Hospital.

Defendant's reply memorandum

argued that, even if the University Hospital were liable, plaintiff's recovery would still be limited to $250,000 because of
subsequent amendments that reinstated the liability limit to the
University Hospital. Plaintiff submitted a supplemental memorandum
contesting the constitutionality of the amendments.
7

During the

lower court proceedings plaintiff never asserted, even in passing,
that the UGIA unconstitutionally deprived her of a remedy against
state employees•

Plaintiff did not even cite that portion of the

UGIA extending immunity to state employees.

Rather, the immunity

of state employees was never an issue at the trial level.
On appeal plaintiff now seeks to raise the employee-immunity
issue for the first time.

This is completely inappropriate.

This

Court has repeatedly emphasized that defenses, claims, and issues
not raised at the trial level cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal.

See Banaerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah

1983); Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981).

"This

general rule applies equally to constitutional issues,11 Pratt, 639
P.2d at 173-74, and also to appeals from lower court rulings on
summary judgment motions.

See e.g., Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d

1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983); Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214,
215 (Utah 1981); Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973).
Plaintiff

"did not

. . . raise

[her employee-immunity

before the trial court and has therefore waived
present them on appeal."

issues]

any right to

Crookston v Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 P.2d

789, 800-01 (Utah 1991).
Additionally, plaintiff has devoted only \ \ pages of her brief
to the new issue of employee immunity.

Within this limited space

plaintiff simply assumes, without support, that the law favors her
position.

As the brief of the Attorney General demonstrates, the

new issue raised by plaintiff is difficult and complex and cannot
be decided in conclusory fashion.

8

In order to succeed on her new issue plaintiff must prove two
essential points.

First, plaintiff must prove that she had a

remedy against state physicians at common law.

Plaintiff's brief

does not address this issue in the slightest, but simply concludes
that

the

element

is

satisfied.

Appellee's

brief,

p.

24.

Plaintiff's self-serving conclusion is far from sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the UGIA is unconstitutional.

The

Attorney General's brief demonstrates that state employees had a
broad grant of immunity at common law.
determined

by

analysis.

applying

a

Employee immunity was

discretionary/ministerial

function

This analysis has not even been mentioned by plaintiff.

In order to apply the discretionary/ministerial function analysis
to the instant case it would be necessary to research and brief the
issue to the same extent that the parties have researched and
briefed the governmental/proprietary

function distinction.

The

parties cannot possibly perform the necessary research and briefing
at this stage in the appellate proceeding.
In addition to showing the existence of a common law remedy,
plaintiff must also prove that the UGIA deprived her of the remedy
without providing

a comparable

substitute.

Plaintiff's

brief

similarly fails to address this element and again simply concludes
that the element is satisfied.

Appellee's Brief, p. 25. Plaintiff

cannot satisfy her burden of proof on such assumptions.

The issue

of whether

extensive

a substitute remedy

is adequate requires

research and briefing, as demonstrated in the brief of the Attorney
General.

The reasonableness of a substitute remedy cannot be based

upon monetary value alone, but must also consider the fact that the
9

new r e m e d y s u b s t i t u t e s a s o l v e n t d e f e n d a n t f o r a p o t e n t i a l l y
r u p t d e f e n d a n t and e l i m i n a t e s t h e h a s s l e s and e x p e n s e s
with multiple-defendant

lawsuits.

Plaintiff

has not

t h a t h e r a l l e g e d remedy a g a i n s t t h e r e s i d e n t

issue

cannot

briefing.

If

plaintiff's

demonstrated

i n t e r n was

substan-

new i s s u e i s b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of t h i s a p p e a l ,

e v i d e n c e d by t h e p a r t i e s '
The

associated

state.2

t i a l l y g r e a t e r t h a n h e r remedy a g a i n s t t h e
Plaintiff's

bank-

be

issue statements

discussed

t h e Court r u l e s

without

extensive

below.

research

and

new i s s u e b a s e d o n l y

upon

t h e Court c o u l d be l e d

into

on t h i s

unsupported conclusions,

and t h e r e c o r d

as

t h e same t y p e of e r r o r c a u s e d by i n a d e q u a t e b r i e f i n g i n C o n d e m a r i n .
The m e r i t s of p l a i n t i f f ' s
in

light

of

the

fact

that

new i s s u e a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e a t

none

of

the

d e f e n d a n t s have acknowledged t h e i s s u e .
inclined
another

to

accept

case

researched

where

the

and b r i e f e d .

the issue in t h i s
C.

plaintiff's

numerous

cited

However, i f t h i s C o u r t

new a r g u m e n t

employee-immunity
Plaintiff

cases

best

it

should

issue

has

do s o

by
is
in

been

fully

has waived h e r r i g h t t o

raise

case.

THE DAMAGE LIMITATION DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION,

Plaintiff

devotes

the

remaining

portion

of

her

brief

to

arguing t h a t t h e UGIA's l i a b i l i t y l i m i t of $250,000 v i o l a t e s due

Notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f S h e l l y Hipwell has passed away,
her family w i l l continue t o r e c e i v e $1,315 a month u n t i l July 1, 2009; $15,000
a year for four years beginning on July 1, 2003; and $21,500 a year for four
years beginning on July 1, 2007. (R. 2 1 6 ) . The burden of proof i s on p l a i n t i f f
t o show t h a t she could have recovered more than t h i s from the r e s i d e n t i n t e r n
t h a t performed her operation, who was capable of f i l i n g for bankruptcy.
P l a i n t i f f has not s a t i s f i e d her burden of proof on t h i s p o i n t .
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process and equal protection.

None of the various arguments raised

by plaintiff are valid, as shown below.
1.

The Rational Basis Standard Should be Used to Scrutinize
the UGIA.

Plaintiff argues that the UGIA should be scrutinized under the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review even if the "open courts"
clause

has

not

been

violated.

Plaintiff

claims

that

scrutiny is appropriate because "the damage limitation

strict
[in the

UGIA] severely restricted the important substantive right of an
individual to recover for personal injuries." Appellee's brief, p.
27.

Plaintiff

further

claims

that

the

right

to recover

for

personal injuries is a property right separately protected by the
due process clause, without any reliance upon the "open courts"
clause.

This represents a pure substantive due process argument.

As Justice Stewart pointed out in Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), substantive due process analysis
is largely a thing of the past and constitutes an illegitimate
exercise of judicial power:
The era of federal substantive due process analysis ended
shortly after Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct.
505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). That era stands as the high
water mark of an ill-fated and, I believe, illegitimate
exercise of judicial power in the realm of legislative
power. I strongly oppose any effort to put this Court on
that track for a variety of reasons, including my view of
separation of powers. Although substantive due process
has not been wholly abandoned in some states, including
Utah, it has by and large only been employed in cases of
extreme arbitrariness, and this is not such a case.
Id. at 369 (Justice Stewart).
Plaintiff cannot prevail on her substantive due process claim.
In Condemarin three justices rejected the notion that the due
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process clause contains a substantive right to a remedy for
personal injuries.
Howe).

See Id. at 369, 378 (J.J. Stewart, Hall, &

Even the remaining justices, who favored substantive due

process analysis, found that a violation of the "open courts"
provision was necessary to invoke the doctrine.

See Id. at 357,

3 66-68 (J.J. Durham & Zimmerman).
As shown repeatedly throughout defendants' briefs, the UGIA
does

not

violate

Constitution.
"rational

the

"open

courts"

provision

the

Utah

Consequently the UGIA will be scrutinized under the

basis" standard

of review rather than the

scrutiny" standard advanced by plaintiff.
provision

of

is not violated

directly

"strict

When the "open courts"

plaintiff

cannot use the

provision indirectly to obtain a heightened level of scrutiny under
due process and equal protection analysis.

See Estate of Carcrill

v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 707 (N.H. 1979) (discussed on
pp. 37-38 of Sharp's original brief).
Significantly, plaintiff has been unable to cite a single case
where a governmental immunity act was invalidated under substantive
due process analysis. In contrast, defendants have cited numerous
cases upholding governmental immunity acts and their liability
limits under all types of constitutional attacks. The overwhelming
majority

of case precedent

is clearly

in defendants' favor.

Plaintiff's substantive due process argument lacks sufficient legal
grounds to avoid awarding summary judgment to defendants.
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2.

The Damage Limitation in the U6IA is Constitutional Under
a Rational Basis Standard of Review.

When

determining

whether

a

statute

violates

the

equal

protection or due process clauses the courts apply one of three
levels of scrutiny to the statute.

As pointed out throughout

Condemarin, the level of scrutiny applied depends on the type of
constitutional right infringed upon. Generally speaking, statutes
that infringe upon fundamental rights (under due process analysis)
or discriminate based upon the suspect classes of race and alienage
(under equal protection analysis) are subject to "strict scrutiny."
In strict scrutiny cases the statute will only be upheld when the
statute

is

necessary

to

accomplish

a

compelling

government

objective, and even then the statute must utilize the least
restrictive alternative available.

Statutes that infringe upon

important constitutional rights (under due process analysis) or
that discriminate based upon sex, illegitimacy, or alienage (under
equal protection analysis) are subject to mid-tier scrutiny.

In

those cases a statute will be upheld when the statute is substantially related to an important government objective.

All other

statutes receive mere "rational basis" scrutiny, where the statute
need

only

objective.

be

rationally

related

to

a

legitimate

government

See generally Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 354-360 (J.

Durham) ; Id. at 368 (J. Zimmerman) ; Id. at 373 (J. Stewart) ; Id. at
380-81 (J.J. Hall & Howe).

Under rational basis scrutiny the Court

is very deferential to the legislature.

See Id. at 354, 359.

The rational basis standard is, beyond doubt, the appropriate
standard of scrutiny to use in this case.
13

All of the justices in

Condemarin agreed that the liability limit in the UGIA did not
interfere with a fundamental right so as to be subject to strict
scrutiny.

See Id. at 354, 266, 373, 378. While three justices in

Condemarin did apply mid-tier scrutiny, they all did so upon the
belief that the UGIA conflicted with the
of the Utah Constitution.

"open courts" provision

The justices seemed to recognize that,

absent a conflict with "open courts," the UGIA would be subject to
mere rational basis scrutiny.

See e.g. Id. at 354, 373.

In this case the 1987 UGIA does not conflict with the "open
courts" provision.

Consequently the 1987 UGIA should be scruti-

nized under the rational basis standard of review.
Plaintiff argues that the UGIA would be unconstitutional even
under the rational basis standard of review because a "less drastic
alternative was available" and because the liability limit was not
"urgently and overwhelmingly necessary" for the protection of the
public treasury.

This argument is invalid on its face.

Only the

strict scrutiny standard of review considers whether there is a
"less drastic alternative" and whether a statute is "necessary."
Such considerations do not apply under rational basis scrutiny,
where a statute is only required to be rationally related to a
legitimate government

objective.

Plaintiff

has confused the

differing standards of review.
Plaintiff also argues that "appellants made no showing in the
court below that the damage limitation was necessary to preserve
the public treasury."

Appellees' brief, p. 31 (emphasis added).

Besides the fact that a showing of "necessity" is not required
under the rational basis standard, plaintiff's argument must also
14

fail for the reason that the burden of proof is upon plaintiff, and
not defendants, to show that the UGIA is unconstitutional.

Again

plaintiff is attempting to improperly shift her burden of proof to
defendants.
Plaintiff argues that "issues of fact exist" that prevent this
Court from determining whether the rational basis test is satisfied.

Plaintiff fails to realize that the rational basis test is

a legal standard of review to be decided by the Court.
The UGIA is certainly constitutional under the rational basis
standard of review. It cannot be realistically questioned that the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting public funds.

Nor

can it be realistically questioned that the UGIA does in fact
protect public monies.

Consequently, the UGIA is rationally

related to a legitimate government objective so as to satisfy the
rational basis test.
Protection of the public treasury is not the only government
objective furthered by the UGIA.

The UGIA allows the state to

provide high-risk medical care that is unavailable at private
institutions because of the fear of malpractice claims. The UGIA's
liability limit also helps the state attract quality physicians and
specialists into Utah to work at the University Medical Center. In
addition, the liability limit makes it possible for the state to
operate a medical school for the benefit of its citizens, thus
fulfilling its constitutional mandate of providing institutes of
higher learning.

See Utah Const, art. X, §§ 1, 4.

Nearly every court considering the constitutionality of a
statutory limit on a state's liability has applied the rational
15

basis

test

and

has

concluded

that

the

Condemarin is one of the rare exceptions.

test

is

satisfied.

There, the plurality

applied mid-tier scrutiny because they were led to believe that the
UGIA conflicted with the "open courts" provision of the state
constitution.

In

virtually

every

other

case

the

statutory

liability limit has been upheld, as demonstrated by the many
authorities already cited in defendants' briefs.

Numerous other

examples can be found by referring to the annotation in 43 A.L.R.
4th 19 (1986) , where the cases are so one-sided that they are
summarized as follows:
Courts have almost uniformly recognized that legislative
bodies have the power to prescribe [liability] limits,
and that the limits prescribed are constitutionally
valid. Though they may abridge the remedies of victims
of government, as opposed to private torts, damage
limitation statutes or ordinances are almost unanimously
viewed as having a rational basis in the government's
need to provide for effective risk management. . . . In
addition to repelling equal protection attacks on damage
limitation laws, the courts have also consistently
rejected arguments that such enactments violate due
process, or that they abridge state constitutional
guarantees of access to courts for redress of grievances,
or impair vested rights.
Annot., 43 A.L.R. 4th 19, 25 (1986) (emphasis added).
The overwhelming precedents cited by defendants stand in
shocking contrast to the sparse authority offered by plaintiff. In
all of her briefing, both at the trial level and on appeal, plaintiff has only cited two cases holding that a statute limiting the
liability of the state is unconstitutional.

One of these cases is

Condemarin which, as already discussed, was based upon an assumption that the UGIA violated the "open courts" clause.

The other

case is Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985).

Pfost is
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inapplicable to this case because it was decided after the State of
Montana passed a constitutional amendment that "swept aside all
notions of governmental immunity, and provided . . . ' [that] the
state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental
entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or
property.'"

Id. at 499, quoting Montana Const, art II, § 18.

Prior to the amendment "the State and its agents enjoyed total
immunity from suit or tort action[s]. . . . "

Id.

Pfost is thus

blatantly distinguishable from the case at hand.
Plaintiff has also cited to Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978).

Arneson has absolutely no application to this case

because it did not involve a government entity and did not involve
a governmental

immunity

statute.

Instead, Arneson

involved a

private entity under a medical malpractice statute.

This also

holds true for each of the six cases that plaintiff string-cited in
footnote

2 of her

brief.

As defendant's

original

brief

has

adequately demonstrated, and as plaintiff has failed to rebut, the
overwhelming majority of courts have upheld statutes limiting the
liability of state entities under a governmental immunity act.
In light of the foregoing it is apparent that the trial court
erred in concluding that the amended UGIA is unconstitutional.

The

trial court's decision should be reversed and summary judgment
should be entered in defendants' favor.
3.

The 1987 Amendment Cured any Constitutional Defect that
Existed in the UGIA Prior to the Amendment.

Plaintiff's final argument alleges that the 1987 amendment did
not remedy the constitutional defects held to exist in the UGIA by
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Condemarin.

In support plaintiff advances two arguments, neither

of which survive scrutiny•
(a)

The 1987 amendment was not intended to eliminate
the varying classifications created by the UGIA.

Plaintiff argues that the amended UGIA is unconstitutional
because the 1987 amendment does not eliminate the differing treatment given to victims of government tort feasors and victims of
private tort feasors.

Plaintiff does not understand the purpose

and effect of the 1987 amendment.
Plaintiff incorrectly assumes that the UGIA must eliminate all
classifications and differing treatment in order to be constitutional.

If this were so a large number of the state's current

statutes would be unconstitutional, including its welfare statutes.
The fact that a statute treats individuals differently does not
mean that the statute is unconstitutional, but simply means that
the statute will be subject to judicial scrutiny.

The level of

scrutiny applied depends upon the right that is infringed upon.
The 1987 amendment is not intended to eliminate the UGIA's varying
classifications, but is rather intended to decrease the level of
judicial scrutiny by eliminating conflict with the "open courts"
provision.

This is accomplished by defining all state activities

as "governmental functions."

By eliminating conflict with the

"open courts" provision the 1987 amendment reduces the level of
scrutiny applied to the UGIA from "mid-tier" to "rational basis,"
which is the crucial issue, as recognized by Justice Durham.
Condemarin. 775 P. 2d at 359 ("The

See

crucial issue in such cases

remains which standard of review the Court chooses to apply").
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(b)

The power to define "governmental
vested in the legislature.

function11 is

As demonstrated, at common law state entities could not be
sued without the state's consent. The UGIA provides the statutory
scheme needed to sue the state.

Under the legislature's plan the

state first retains all of its immunities by extending immunity to
"governmental functions," which are defined to include all state
activities.

The state then waives its immunity up to $250,000.

Plaintiff

challenges

the

legislature's

power

to

define

"governmental function" under its own statutory scheme.

By so

doing, plaintiff also challenges the state's right to determine
which of its entities will be subject to suit.

Plaintiff's argu-

ments constitute a challenge to the entire common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which gives the state exclusive power to determine when it will be subject to suit.

This Court has previously

held that "sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional," and therefore plaintiff's arguments must fail as a matter of law. Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983).
Plaintiff argues that the state will be able to abuse its
immunities if it is allowed to define its own activities as
"governmental functions." Significantly, plaintiff cannot point to
any existing abuse of legislative power, but simply poses hypothetical . If this Court is concerned that the legislature might
abuse its power in the future, the Court should wait until such an
abuse of power is manifest before striking down the UGIA.

The

legislature has controlled governmental immunity since the time of
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statehood without any abuse of power.

More than likely no abuse

will ever be manifest.
The UGIA itself is not an abuse of legislative power. Rather,
the UGIA is the result of extensive research into the best way to
balance an individual's need for a remedy with the state's need for
solvency.

Prior to its adoption the UGIA was subjected to exten-

sive study, research, debate and analysis, as evidenced by legislative history:
The 1963 legislature directed the Council to study the
effects upon states, their political subdivisions and
municipal corporations of waiver of immunity from suit
and consenting to be liable for the torts of its
officers, employees, and agents. . . . The legislature
considered this study of such importance that it
separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and directed
the Council to appoint a committee. . . .
* * *

Research activities
include field investigations,
gathering of data, assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legislation, and the
preparation of a final report. Investigations of the
claims experience of the state and its political subdivisions has been included in the Committee study. The
extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities,
the cost of such insurance and claims experience have
been part of the study.
Questionnaires were sent to
other states in regard to tort claims and consequential
damage claims. The statutes of other states have been
reviewed and catalogued. The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section. Case decisions have
been studied. Conferences have been held with insurance
personnel and rating information has been obtained from
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
Seven
working drafts of legislation have been prepared and
studied by the staff, by committee members, and by the
executive committee.
The committee considered the important questions of
whether governmental immunity from suit was important in
the state and whether legislation was needed.
Addendum, pp.

16-17

(Report and Recommendations

Legislative Council, 1963-1965) (emphasis added).
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of the Utah

Legislative history further shows that the state was aware of
the need to provide its citizens with a remedy against the state•
However, the legislature was also concerned that providing new
remedies might be too burdensome:
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and
property by negligent acts of government employees and by
the construction of public improvements.
In many of
these cases no recourse against the governmental entity
has been possible. It was found that the present [common
law] system works substantial injustice to citizens.
There is fear, however, among government officials, that
to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too
burdensome upon governmental funds.
Addendum, p. 17. See also Addendum, pp. 9-14 (Legislature had real
fear that unlimited waiver of immunity would overwhelm state).
The UGIA represents a balance between the tort victim's need
for a remedy and the state's need for solvency.
struck

by codifying

the

state's common

law

waiving the immunity up to a limited amount.
given

jurisdiction

to

determine

the

This balance was
immunity

and

then

The courts are only

state's

liability

where

immunity has been waived:
This legislation reaffirms the rule of governmental
immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law, and
then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of
justice, immunity from suit should be waived. No effort
is made in the bill to create new or unique rules of
substantive liability as far as governmental agencies are
concerned.
Where immunity is waived, liability or
responsibility would then be determined by the courts.
Addendum, p. 19 (emphasis added).
The legislature concluded that the UGIA's "part-way [waiver of
immunity] does protect the citizens of our state." Addendum, p. A-

21

As shown above, the UGIA was intended to benefit the citizens
of Utah by providing them with a remedy against the state where
none previously existed.
power.

The UGIA is not an abuse of legislative

The legislature acted in good faith when it adopted the

UGIA and the legislation should be upheld.
Plaintiff also argues that "the legislature cannot by fiat
make everything a governmental function. . . . "
p. 36.

Appellee's brief,

However, plaintiff cites only two cases, neither of which

support her argument. Rather, both cases support defendant's claim
that the legislature can define "governmental function."
The first case plaintiff cites is Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp.. 605 P. 2d 1230 (Utah 1980) . In Standiford this Court derived
a test to be used for determining whether a government entity is
performing a "governmental function" under the UGIA.

At the time

the test was created the term "governmental function" was not
defined by the UGIA.
defining

The 1987 amendment remedied this defect by

"governmental

function."

Plaintiff

argues that the

Standiford definition of "governmental function" should prevail
over the

legislature's

definition.

This

is incorrect.

In

Standiford this Court made it clear that it was defining "governmental function" only because the UGIA "gives this Court the power
to define understandably and logically the term "governmental
function."

Id. at 1235.

The Court then defined "governmental

function" in the manner that it believed to be "consistent with the
plain legislative intent in [the UGIA]."
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Id. at 1237.

Additionally, Standiford recognized that the legislature could
define "governmental function" to include government-owned hospitals and thereby overrule prior case precedent to the contrary:
Subsequent to the decision in Greenhalqh v. Pavson City,
supra, § 63-30-3 was amended to specifically exempt
governmentally-owned hospitals. . . . To the extent that
Payson City is now covered by § 63-30-3, the holding in
Greenhalqh has been legislatively overruled.
Id. at 1232 n.l.
Standiford

thus

shows

that

the

Court

will

yield

to

the

legislature when it comes to defining "governmental function."
The second case cited by plaintiff is Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).
to the UGIA that included

Hansen involved a 1984 amendment

flood control activities within the

definition of "governmental function."

This Court allowed the

legislature to amend the definition of "governmental function" to
include flood control activities and upheld the UGIA, stating that:
We are persuaded that the weight of logic, legislative
history, and constitutional imperatives supports the
conclusion that the amendment does no more than define
flood control activities to be governmental functions.
Id. at 845-46.
Additionally, although the 1987 amendment was not at issue,
this Court seemed to recognize that the amendment is authoritative:
The
Act
was
Act

term "governmental function" was not defined by the
until 1987. . . . Until 1987, the scope of the term
defined by our case law, as it had been before the
was passed.

Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Standiford and Hansen, along with approximately 24 other cases
cited in Sharp's original brief, all suggest that the legislature
can define

"governmental

function."
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Plaintiff

has

completely

failed to cite any authority to the contrary.

Plaintiff's lack of

authority demonstrates the weakness of her argument and makes it
impossible for her to overcome the presumption of validity attached
to the 1987 amendment.

The overwhelming majority of cases hold

that the legislature can control the entire field of governmental
immunity, including the definition of "governmental function."
In this regard, it is important that this case be decided on
the legal merits and not on personal opinions regarding the value
of governmental immunity.

The control of governmental immunity is

undisputedly vested in the legislature alone.

The legislature is

uniquely capable of performing the extensive studies necessary to
properly balance the competing interests involved in governmental
immunity issues.

Prior to adopting the UGIA the Utah Legislature

engaged in such studies and determined that the UGIA strikes the
proper balance.

The citizens of Utah have placed their trust in

their legislators to make this determination.

The UGIA should not

be overturned simply because the Court thinks that the Act is
unwise or unfair:
This Court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it
is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom
is for the legislature to determine.
If the act is
unjust, amendments to correct the inequities should be
made by
the
legislature
and
not
by
judicial
interpretation. Years of study and millions of dollars
have been spent on research and study . . . , and the
legislature is able to profit by these efforts when
considering legislation on the subject.
If after
considering the reasons for and against a bill, the
legislature enacts it into law, arguments for correction
of any claimed inequities should be addressed to the
legislature where they can be considered and if found to
exist, be corrected.
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Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,
126-27, 191 P.2d 612, 625 (1948).
If this Court goes against the great weight of authority and
overturns the UGIA and its liability

limit, the Court will be

stripping the control of governmental immunity from the legislature
and vesting that control in the judiciary.

Such an act would

violate the separation of powers clause of Utah Const, art. V, § 1.
See Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 377-78, 366 P.2d 986, 988
(1961).

Such an act would also increase the confusion that already

exists in the governmental immunity arena because of contradictory
statutes and judicial opinions.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case supporting her
argument

on

any

material

issue.

The

overwhelming

weight

of

authority shows that the liability limit contained in the 1987 UGIA
is constitutional.

The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

Defendant therefore urges this Court to reverse the trial court.
DATED this

day of December, 1992.
STRONG7& HANNI

"David TT. Niels'on

~

Attorneys for Defendant Roger T. Sharp
104520bc
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

n_n

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-2.

Definitions-

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions of this section and renumbered the subsections accordingly, added present Subsection (4), and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.—Except as may
be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3.

(Original

63-30-3.

—

1965)

Immunity of governmental entities from suit.

Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities [-skall-be^ are immune form suit for any injury which (mey-re9u&4offn
v i l C tl"CTVTLlvJiJ \TT o l l l v l Ull\Tt\>T\Zi3
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results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility.

(1978 amendment)

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27,
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in
ch. 93, § 1.
the second paragraph.

(Controlling statute)

63-30-34- Limit of judgment against governmental entity
or employee(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.

LAWS
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH,
PASSED AT THE

FIFTH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE

Legislature of the State of Utah.
HELD AT

SALT LAKE CITY, THE STATE CAPITAL, IN JANUARY,
FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1903.

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY.

Press and bindery of
THE SKELTON PUBLISHING CO.,
Provo, Utah.

Chap. 115.

LAWS OF UTAH.

139

CHAPTER 114.
KINDERGARTENS.
AN ACT providing for the establishment and maintenance of kindergartens, in all school districts of a population of two
thousand and upwards.

Be it enacted by the Legislature

of the State of Utah :

SECTION 1. Kindergartens provided for. All school districts of a
population of two thousand and upwards, shall hereafter establish
and maintain, one or more kindergartens, in said school district;
open to children resident therein, between the ages of four and six
years. Said kindergartens must be established within four years
after the pass; ge of this act.
Sec. 2. How maintained. T h e cost of maintaining such kindergartens shall come out of the district school fund, )f the respective
districts.
Sec. \\. This act shall take effect July 1st, 190)5,
Approved this 10th day of March, 1903.

CHAPTER 115.
S T A T E MENTAL HOSPITAL.
AN ACT amending chapter 7, titie 61, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, relating tc the government and control of t t o
State Mental Hospital and providing for the care and treatment of the insane.

Be it enacted by the Legislature

of the State of Utah ;

SECTION 1. T h a t chapter.7, title .til, Revised S t a t u t e s of Utah,
1898, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 2153. Location. Until otherwise provided, the S t a t e Insane
Asylum now established and located at Provo City, in the county of
Utah, shall be hereafter known as the State Mental Hospital.
Sec. 2154. Objects. The objects of the hospital shall be to care
for all insane persons residing within the State, and to furnish to
them proper attendance, medical treatment, seclusion, rest, restraint,
entertainment, occupation and support tending to restore the mental
and physical health of such persons or to alleviate their sufferings.
Sec. 2155. Board of Insanity. The government and control of
the S t a t e Mental Hospital shall be vested in a board, to consist of
t h e Governor, S t a t e T r e a s u r e r and State Auditor, which shall be
known as t h e Board of Insanity.
Sec. 2156. Id. Traveling expenses. Each member of the board
shall be allowed his traveling expenses in attending t h e meetings of
the board, payable out of any money in t h e treasury of the hospital.
Sec. 2157. Id, Powers, T h e board may contract and be con-
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INSANE ASYLUM.

CHAPTER

INSANE

SECTION.

693

VIII.

ASYLUM.

SECTION.

1940 .Insane Asylum established: title. 1976 Discharge on showing that pa1941 Board of directors; their suetient not insane; form of order.
cessors; Governor a member. 1977 Precedence when not sufficient
1942 Vacancies, how
filled.
room.
1943 Directors to qualify; when to 1978 Provision for indigent not to
organize.
relieve estate of patient.
1944 Site to be selected.
1979 Infectious and contagious cases
1945 Plan of buildings; their erection.
excluded.
194(5 Directors to have no interest in 1980 Relatives or friends may pay
contracts.
towards expenses and credit to
1947 Number of patients provision to
be given.
be made for.
1981 Parties receiving papers are
1948-1953 Style of board of directors;
liable; may appeal.
their powers and duties.
1982 Officers, e t c . , exempt from jury
1954 Compensation of directors.
duty.
1955 Treasurer and duties; term of 1983 Insane person at large may be
office.
arrested.
1956 Secretary; duties of.
1984 Persons not to be restrained of
1957-19(52 Powers and duties of board
liberty except according to this
of directors.
act, for insanity.
1963-1964 Qualifications of medical 1985 Fees of examining physicians.
superintendent: his duties; his 1986 County to pay costs, etc.; how
accounts to be audited; semireimbursed.
yearly estimates; supplies, how 1987 When probate judge to make incontracted for; record to be
quiry.
kept; annual report.
1988 Provisions for insane excluded
1965 Assistant physiciau;
duties;
for want of room.
compensation: term of office. 1989 Penalty for attempting to intro1966-1969 Manner of deciding applicaduce patients contrary to this
tions for inmates and proceedact.
ings.
~" 1990 Penalty for wanton cruelty to
1970 Charges for inmates, how sepersons restrained as insane.
cured and paid; moneys found 1991 Penalty for unlawful entry upon
on inmates may be delivered to
asylum premises.
friends.
1992 Penalty for inducing patient to
1971 Delivery of patients to asylum.
elope.
1972 When patients able to pay cost 1993 Penalty for bringing pauper inof maintenence: how secured:
sane, etc., into county to be a
guardian.
charge there.
1973 Guardian to give bond.
1994 Penalty for other violations of
1974 Papers to be sent to persons
act.
liable for charges.
1995 Act, when to take effect.
1975 Kindred of insane person may
receive him from asylum, bond
to be given; form.

§ 1940. s 1. There shall be established upon a site t o T e m t o n a l
be selected by the board of directors hereinafter provided for, Asvium
and institution for the care and treatment of the insane, to be
designated and known as the Territorial Insane Asvium.
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Senate Debate on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
January 18, 1965
Senator Welch (introducing the bill):
Now, I'd like to, I'd like to very briefly, uh, explain to you
the experience that has occurred in our neighboring states.

And

this is one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it is very important
that we act upon this bill.
About a year, about two years ago now, the Supreme Court of
the State of California, by a court order in response to a, a case,
a specific case brought before that court, just by a court rule and
court order abolished —
immunity in that state.

completely abolished —

governmental

Within overnight practically, that state

was besieged with millions of dollars worth of suits and claims
against the State of California and its entities. This matter was
of such great importance to the people of the State of California
that a, that a special session of the legislature of the State of
California

was

moratorium

on

called.
suits

And

against

California or its entities.

that
the

special

session

government of the

passed

a

State of

And this moratorium was for a year's

time, until such time as they could make a study and come back with
recommendations to the legislature.
They did come back and they did make recommendations and they
did pass a bill.

They passed a series of bills, a very complex

series of bills. We have, we have had the benefit of those bills.
We have studied them.

00004231
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That those bills in that state, uh, that

1

legislature, set out immunity by statute in the State of California
and as we go along you'll find out that's exactly what we've done.
They set up immunity by statute and then out of the immunity the
State of California, through its legislative process, carved out
certain areas in which an action might be brought by the citizens
of that state against the government of the State of California or
its entities or subdivisions.

This is a matter of controlling, to

a certain extent, rather than leaving the thing wide open.
I would like to also emphasize that about a year ago in the
State of Arizona the Supreme Court did exactly the same thing. And
I could read you that decision if you like, I have it here, but I'm
not going to bore you with it.
said this:

But the supreme court in essence

The rule of governmental immunity is a rule that has

been set up and adopted by the courts.

It is not a statutory

creature and therefore it can be abolished by the courts and we
therefore abolish statutory or I mean governmental immunity from
suit in our state.
I was on a panel with the assistant director of uh, the
legislative council of the State of Arizona.

This was about two

months ago over in the State of Wyoming at the Western Conference
of the Council of State Governments.

I was uh, chairman of the

panel in connection with governmental immunity and I have there, on
the panel with me, this man from Arizona. We also had a professor
from the State of California whose is largely responsible for the,
for the research and work that went into the California act. This

00004231
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man from Arizona said immediately upon the, upon the, uh, abolition
or striking out and, uh, overruling of governmental immunity in
their state by this court order, that they were beset by Six
Million Dollars worth of suits.
working

and planning

California did.

to

And they are very anxiously

solve the problem

such

as the way

And I have provided them with materials which we

have, which we have uh, been able to develop in this state.
Now, this isn't all.

About six months ago the court of the

State of Nevada did exactly the same thing.

Now I want to merely

point out to you, what I'm trying to point out to you and trying to
get over to you is the fact that a court order or a court decision
which

completely

waives

and does

away with

the

doctrine of

governmental immunity then throws the doors wide open to all and
every kind of suit that might be brought.

And I'd like to, to

state that, that our approach to this matter has been to take a
middle of the road course. To open the door for those people where
there's obvious uh, serious handicap to the individual who has been
injured, but not to leave it open, that door wide open so that it
will

be

detrimental

to

the

interest

of

the

state

and

its

subdivisions.
Tape No. 2, Lines 8.3 to 14.5.
* * *

Now I'd like to, after going through that general, general
discussion, I'd like to just, just briefly run through some of the
provisions of this bill and I'll appreciate it if you'll turn to

00004231
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the bill.

It's Senate Bill 4, Senate Bill 4 in your file there.

Now if you'll note the first part of this bill just has to do with
definitions and I don't think we'll need to spend any time on that.
Section 2, if you'll read it, reaffirms for this state the doctrine
of governmental immunity.

It does it by statute.

We do not have

governmental immunity by statute in the State of Utah.

We have

governmental immunity only by reason of having the court having
said so. And therefore the court could waive it if it wanted to.
So we reaffirm in this statute, in this bill, the doctrine of
governmental immunity, Section 2. I'm, I'm uh, I think I'm wrong.
Section 3.

Section 3.

It says "Except as may be otherwise

provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from the activity of said
entity wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge
of a governmental function." Now, we reaffirm that and then later
on we carve out of that immunity various areas.
Tape 2, Line 24 to 26.
* * *

I have uh, uh, about gone through this bill uh, gentlemen. I
want to assure you that, that in my opinion this is a necessary
bill.

I think that it will not hurt the State of Utah or its

subdivisions. I think that it will be helpful because I think that
uh, we have just as much a possibility of the court, the courts
taking this matter into their hands and determining that there is,
that there should be a doing away with this doctrine.

0000423X
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I'm not

going to foretell when and how, but it has happened in the
surrounding states and I think that this, this approach that we
have seen is the reasonable approach. It is not, it is not opening
the door all the way, and I've said this about three times and I
want to emphasize it, it is not opening the door all the way to
allowing suits of every kind against the state and its entities.
It opens it part-way.

But this part-way opening does protect the

citizens of our state.
Tape 3, Line 20 to 22.
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the court in habitual cruancy cases, clarification of the role of the probation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases,
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional judgeship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior judge, also,
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile.
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the
State.

Governmental Immunity
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council

fl

to study the effects upon

states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its
officers, employees, and agents as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th
Legislature.11 (S.J.R. 14, item 2.)

The Legislature considered this study

of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the
membership from the legal profession.

The Council appointed a committee of

twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities,
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests.
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to Miive
governmental immunity.

In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the

Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass.
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data,
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legislation, and the preparation of a final report.

Investigations of the claims

experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in
the Committee study.

The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities,

the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the study.
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and consequential damage claims.
catalogued.

The statutes of other states have been reviewed and

The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section.

Case decisions have been studied.

Conferences have been held with insurance

personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters.

Seven working drafts of legislation have been pre-

pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive
Committee.
The Committee considered the important questions of whether governmental
immunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was
needed.
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by
negligent acts of government employees and by the construction of public
improvements.

In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental

entity has been possible.

It was found that the present system works sub-

stantial injustice to citizens.

There is a fear, however, among government

officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burdensome upon governmental funds.
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions
of public employees.

The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard-

ing responsibility for consequential damage.

This latter type of claim is

- 47 -

for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of public improvements.

It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is

merely the consequence of a particular government activity.
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee.
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State.
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to defective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges.

The State Road Commission

has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries
resulting from the negligence of its employees.

The Fish and Game Commission

must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife.

It was also found that

837o of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry automobile insurance, and 307* of those carry comprehensive liability insurance.
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the
cost of general liability insurance.

There would probably be more claims

filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these
claims.
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to protect both the entity and the employee.
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and appropriation or refusal.

If a state agency is not otherwise authorized by law to

pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized
and claims must be channelled through the Board.

- 48 -

The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that
adopted in California and in some other states.

This legislation reaffirms

the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law,
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immunity from suit should be waivedor unique rules of substantive
concerned.

No effort is made in the bill to create new
liability as far as governmental agencies are

Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then

be determined by the courts.
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the
permissive purchase of liability insurance.
immunity.

This latter bill does not waive

It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-

mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all
claims to an insurance carrier.
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on,
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage.

The second draft merely

permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities.
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of governmental immunity.

Justice of Peace
A follow-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system
was assigned to a committee of the Council.

The Committee believes legisla-

tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment.

The J. P.

system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to
permit the establishment of "community courts."

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of December, 1992, I
caused to be hand delivered four true and correct copies of the
foregoing to:
Richard D. Burbidge
BURBID6E & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, Suite 2 001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
Thomas L. Kay
Paul D. Newman
Mark O. Morris
SNELL & WILHER
111 East Broadway, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Attoryneys for Defendant/Appellant
Tim Healy
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Debra J. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for State of Utah

